The Effect of the Visual Context in the Recognition of Symbolic Gestures by Villarreal, Mirta F. et al.
The Effect of the Visual Context in the Recognition of
Symbolic Gestures
Mirta F. Villarreal
1,2*, Esteban A. Fridman
1, Ramo ´n C. Leiguarda
1
1Department of Cognitive Neurology, Institute for Neurological Research-FLENI, Buenos Aires, Argentina, 2Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Cientı ´ficas y Te ´cnicas-
CONICET, Buenos Aires, Argentina
Abstract
Background: To investigate, by means of fMRI, the influence of the visual environment in the process of symbolic gesture
recognition. Emblems are semiotic gestures that use movements or hand postures to symbolically encode and
communicate meaning, independently of language. They often require contextual information to be correctly understood.
Until now, observation of symbolic gestures was studied against a blank background where the meaning and intentionality
of the gesture was not fulfilled.
Methodology/Principal Findings: Normal subjects were scanned while observing short videos of an individual performing
symbolic gesture with or without the corresponding visual context and the context scenes without gestures. The
comparison between gestures regardless of the context demonstrated increased activity in the inferior frontal gyrus, the
superior parietal cortex and the temporoparietal junction in the right hemisphere and the precuneus and posterior
cingulate bilaterally, while the comparison between context and gestures alone did not recruit any of these regions.
Conclusions/Significance: These areas seem to be crucial for the inference of intentions in symbolic gestures observed in
their natural context and represent an interrelated network formed by components of the putative human neuron mirror
system as well as the mentalizing system.
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Introduction
McNeill [1] ordered human gestures according to what he has
termed ‘‘Kendon’s continuum’’: gesticulation - to pantomimes - to
emblems - to sign language. Emblems are semiotic gestures that
use movement or hand postures to symbolically encode and
communicate meaning. While we immediately recognize what
someone else is doing when observing an emblem even in a neutral
environment, the performer’s intention, that is, why he/she is
doing such a gesture, often requires contextual, essentially visual,
information.
Two hypothetical systems are proposed to explain how people
make judgments about other people’s behavior, such as their goals,
intentions, desires and beliefs. The putative frontoparietal human
mirror neuron system (MNS) allows us to recognize the goal of
perceived actions by matching it to a representation in our
memory of our own actions. It rapidly and intuitively senses the
other person’s goal on the basis of low-level behavioral input [2].
In turn, the mentalizing system is a relatively higher cognitive level
process, which provides us with the capacity to understand the
other’s intentions and thoughts as if we could read the other’s
mind [3]. It recruits cerebral regions outside the MNS, such as the
superior temporal cortex, the temporoparietal junction, the
posterior cingulate cortex and the medial prefrontal cortex [3–6].
In recent years, different researchers analyzed the intentional
connotation of certain actions by manipulating their context or the
way they were performed. Iacoboni et al. [7] studied the neural
activity while subjects observed a hand grasping a cup within and
without a visual context and presented two different ways of
grasping, representing each one with a different goal. They found
activity within the MNS predominantly in the right inferior frontal
gyrus (IFG) when the action was performed within the context, as
well as a different level of activation depending on the intention of
the action. Based on these findings they suggested that MNS uses
both contextual and gestural information to predict intentionality.
Using repetition suppression, Hamilton and Grafton [8] found the
anterior intraparietal sulcus (IPS) to be sensitive to object-directed
grasping actions but not to action trajectories, suggesting that the
MNS coded the immediate goals of actions rather than the
kinematic properties. However, many recent studies found that the
MNS explains ‘‘how’’ others act and ‘‘what’’ they do but not
‘‘why’’ they are doing it, which in turn could be mainly processed
by the ‘‘mentalizing’’ network [4,9–13]. For example, de Lange et
al. [9] recorded neural activity while a participant observed an
actor performing an ordinary or extraordinary goal-directed
action in terms of its intention or its motoric manner. They found
that the IFG bilaterally processes the intentionality of an observed
action on the basis of the visual properties of the action,
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or not. However, when participants selectively attended the inten-
tionality of the action, regions involved in the mentalizing system,
as the right posterior superior temporal sulcus (pSTS), showed
enhanced response. Mentalizing regions are also shown to be
active during observation of movements that were out of context,
unplanned or biomechanically impossible [4,14]. Therefore, it
seems quite reasonable to consider the interpretation of an action
as a multi-componential hierarchical process, where the underly-
ing neural substrates are shaped by learning and experience, and
hierarchy is driven mainly by the required task [15].
Most brain imaging studies investigating goal inference processes
based on visual cues use object-directed actions as stimuli. Emblems
are studied in a variety of ways but not by contrasting them with or
without the appropriate visual context. In this way, Gallagher and
Frith [16] investigated the neural pathways for the perception and
recognition of gestures when usedt oe x p r e s saf e e l i n gv e r s u sa
command, they discovered that the latter elicited activity in a left
lateralized system associated with language and motor imitation. Lotze
et al. [17] compared brain activation during observation of isolated
right hand movements, body-referred movements and expressive
gestures, finding that expressivegestures involved bilateralSTS, medial
prefrontal cortex and Broca’s and Wernicke’s area. Lately, we
investigated the neural pathways of the recognition of symbolic or
intransitive gestures in comparison with the recognition of object-
oriented or transitive gestures [18] and found that symbolic gesture
recognition elicited a stronger activity in the left inferior frontal area.
Up to now, there is no data about how the context influences
the processing of emblematic gestures and how relevant the
information the context provides is. Therefore, we studied the
influence of visual context in the brain processing of symbolic
gesture recognition by means of functional magnetic resonance
imaging. For this purpose, we designed a paradigm where videos
of the same gestures performed by an actor were presented against
a blank background (GESTURE) or within their appropriate
visual context (G-CONTEXT). If the contextual information
provided the gesture with its full meaning and intentionality, we
predicted to find activation of the MNS as well as some brain
structures belonging to the mentalizing system. As the intention-
ality deduced in G-CONTEXT was not the only difference
between the two conditions, a large visual scenario was also
present; we additionally presented videos of the same scenario and
actor but without performing any gesture (CONTEXT) in order
to avoid visual effects in our findings.
Materials and Methods
1.1 Subjects
Nineteen healthy volunteers (10 male, 9 female) aged 29.565.6
years were recruited for this experiment. All participants were right
handed [19] and gave written informed consent approved by the
Institutional Review Board of the Institute for Neurological Research-
FLENI as well as in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki.
1.2 Stimuli and task
The experiment consisted in the presentation of different videos
of approximately 3 s long, depicting three different scenarios. One,
called GESTURE, showed an individual performing a manual
gesture against a blank background. All gestures used involved
symbolic connotations like waving goodbye, hitchhiking, begging,
calling a taxi, asking for a coffee in a bar or for the bill in a
restaurant (the latter, being very common in our country). The
second type of videos consisted of the same gestures but in this case
performed in a more realistic scenario according to the meaning of
the gesture, i.e. hitchhiking on the road, begging on the street. We
named this category G-CONTEXT. The last group called
CONTEXT showed the complex scenario with the subject in it,
but in this case the person remained inactive. Three different
actors performed the eighteen videos (six within each category)
and each set of three videos (same gesture in the three conditions)
was played by the same actor. All gestures involved were
performed with the right hand and the videos were presented to
the volunteer from the 3
rd person perspective. Each video was
repeated 5 times in a pseudorandom order. In Figure 1 we show
single frames of one example displaying the three conditions
(permission for use of images obtained by written consent available
in supporting information).
Participants were instructed to identify the action performed by
the actor and to choose the correct answer according to a text
screen presented one second after the clip ends. Three options
were displayed: two were names of gestures (chosen among the six
used) one corresponding to the right answer and the third to the
word ‘nothing’. The order of the three options was counterbal-
anced to avoid anticipation. A fixation cross at the center of the
screen was used as baseline.
Three scan sessions of 163 volumes each were acquired per
subject. Each run contained 30 trials consisting in the presentation
of one of the videos, followed by the text screen (3 sec) and the
fixation cross within a variable time interval across trials (4–12 s,
mean=6 s). A total of 90 stimuli were presented, 30 per condition
randomly distributed along the sessions. Sessions were counter-
balanced across subjects.
Behaviour and latency were recorded online via a response box
containing three keys for the index, middle and ring fingers. These
recordings were later coded for errors and time responses. Trials
with errors were discarded from the analysis.
1.3 Functional Magnetic Resonance Image
MRI data were acquired on a 1.5T GE HDx scanner with an 8
channel head coil. Change in blood-oxygenation-level-dependent
T2* signal was measured using a gradient echo-planar imaging
(EPI) sequence. Twenty four contiguous slices were taken in the
AC-PC plane (TR: 2.4 s, TE: 50 ms, flip angle: 90u, FOV: 24 cm,
64664 pixels per inch matrix, voxel size=3.7563.7565). A
structural MRI was acquired with the fast SPGR-IR sequence
(120 slices, 1.6-mm thick slices, TR 12.956 ms, TE 6.1 ms, flip
angle 15u, FOV 24 cm, 5126512 matrix). Three scans of 163
volumes were taken per subject.
1.4. Functional MRI Data analysis
Image processing was carried out using SPM2 (Wellcome
Department of Cognitive Neurology, London, UK) implemented
in MATLAB 7 (Mathworks Inc., Sherborn, MA, USA). Slice-
timing correction was applied to each volume. The imaging time
series was realigned to the first volume and spatially normalized to
the stereotactic space of Talairach and Tournoux [20] using
Montreal Neurological Institute reference brain [21]. The
normalized volumes of 26262m m
3 were spatially smoothed by
an isotropic Gaussian kernel of 8 mm at full width half-maximum
[22] and high pass filtered during analysis.
Individual analysis was computed using the general linear model
for an event-related design including the three main conditions:
GESTURE, G-CONTEXT and CONTEXT, (the text-response
stimuli was computed in the design matrix but not considered in
the posterior analysis). The design matrix included correction for
head movements. The effects were modeled by convolving a delta
function for each event type with the canonical hemodynamic
response function to create regressors of interest. Individual linear
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networks between conditions, and the resulting contrast images
were subjected to a random effect analysis to see effects at a group
level. We performed three comparisons: 1) G-CONTEXT -
GESTURE; 2) CONTEXT - GESTURE and 3) G-CONTEXT -
CONTEXT. From the first contrast we obtained areas related
with gesture processing in a semantically congruent context but
also areas related with the context per se. The second contrast was
added to the analysis to observe this environmental effect,
although it did not represent sufficient control for the purely
visual context effect. The third contrast was proposed to separate
related effects from the gesture processing alone.
Therefore, in order to isolate specific activation for gesture
processing in a semantically congruent context, neither elicited by
gesture processing per se or the visual characteristics of the context
itself, we combined contrasts in a conjunction analysis between (G-
CONTEXT – GESTURE) AND (G-CONTEXT – CONTEXT)
to obtain a statistical approach. This analysis identified brain
activations exclusive to G-CONTEXT that were absent in both
GESTURE and CONTEXT.
Additionally, in order to disclose the individual effect of each
condition we extract the BOLD beta weights from spheres of
7 mm radius built around the main coordinates of the relevant
clusters (although bilaterally) that survived the last analysis. All
image results were shown with an uncorrected p value of 0.001
combined with a cluster size threshold of 30 voxels. The
behavioral results were put into an ANOVA for multiple
comparisons, using the Bonferroni test for post hoc pair-wise
comparison, implemented in the SPSS 13.0 package . Results
for this analysis were considered significant at a level of p=,0.05.
Results
2.1 Behavioral results
For the three conditions the error rate in answer accuracies was
3,6% and the mean reaction time (RT) in milliseconds for each
condition was as follows: GESTURES 917.456192.38; G-CON-
TEXT 895.916213.34 and CONTEXT 1172.446276.61. An
ANOVA test between error rates gave a non significant result
(F=3.3, p=0.06). For the RT, the ANOVA showed a significant
main effect of F=24.9, p,0.001 and post hoc Bonferroni test proved
significant for the comparisons between GESTURE vs. CONTEXT
and G-CONTEXT vs. CONTEXT with p,0.001 in both tests and
no significant effect for GESTURE vs. G-CONTEXT.
2.2 Subtraction analysis
G-CONTEXT minus GESTURE showed active clusters
within right inferior frontal gyrus (IFG), right middle frontal gyrus
(MFG) and right superior parietal lobule (SPL) as well as
bilateral precuneus (PC), right temporoparietal junction (TPJ),
right posterior cingulate cortex (PCC) and bilateral occipital areas.
CONTEXT minus GESTURE showed active clusters within
bilateral occipital areas, right middle temporal gyrus, right PCC
and right PC but only significative at voxel level. G-CONTEXT
minus CONTEXT showed active clusters within left IFG, bilateral
MFG and inferior parietal lobule (IPL), right precuneus, right
PCC, bilateral TPJ and occipital areas. Figure 2a resumes the
three comparisons and Table 1, the coordinates of the significant
clusters.
The mean BOLD signal was greater for the G-CONTEXT
condition in all regions and was higher in the right hemisphere.
Figure 2.b shows the plots of the signal of each condition in all
regions and both hemispheres. It is observable that GESTURE
was greater than CONTEXT mainly in the left hemisphere while
the opposite happened in the right hemisphere where CONTEXT
was higher than GESTURE.
2.3 Conjunction analysis
The regions that survived the comparisons (G-CONTEXT –
GESTURE) AND (G-CONTEXT.CONTEXT) were the right
PCC, PC and TPJ and less intense the right IFG, MFG and the
left PC and PCC. Activity in occipital regions was also found.
Figure 3 shows the activation map and Table 2 shows the
coordinates.
Discussion
In this study, we investigated the brain network involved in the
processing of symbolic gestures when immersed in their appro-
priate visual context. We postulated that contextual relevant
information fulfils the role of completing the meaning and
intentionality of the gesture (e.g.; a church or a hospital in the
case of the silence gesture); and so, we predicted to find activation
of brain areas within the putative human MNS in addition to some
areas of the mentalizing system. To verify this hypothesis, we
compared brain response when observing symbolic gestures with
or without their appropriate context and found significant
differences in sectors of the IFG, SPL, TPJ, and PCC, all in the
right hemisphere and bilaterally in the PC with the random effect
analysis. To verify whether these areas corresponded with the
integration of the gesture and it’s context or to environmental
effects, we performed a conjunction analysis to separate the
context and gesture processing effects and found that the regions
that corresponded exclusively to the gesture into context
condition, were the right TPJ, the PCC, the PC, the right IFG
and the MFG. Furthermore, the pattern of activation for each
condition obtained within the selected regions of interest revealed
Figure 1. Experimental conditions. Image frames captured from some of the videos presented. Examples of one gesture (asking for the bill in a
bar) in the three types of presentation: isolated, within the context and the context without the gesture (respectively from left to right).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0029644.g001
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hemispheres which was expected since all items, gesture and rich
environment, were presented in this condition. In relation to the
other two conditions we noticed that in some areas (right IFG,
bilateral PCC and right PC) CONTEXT was higher than
GESTURE, while in turn, there were other zones (left IFG,
Figure 2. Subtraction analysis. Signal increase for (a) G-CONTEXT – GESTURE; (b) CONTEXT – GESTURE and (c) G-CONTEXT – GESTURE. The
coordinates of the planes shown are z=53 (top axial planes); z=18 (bottom axial planes); x=243 (top sagital planes); x=43 (botton sagital planes).
The most relevant regions are labelled. (d) BOLD signal for the three conditions and both hemispheres. In Black: GESTURE, Orange: G-CONTEXT and
Blue: CONTEXT. up) Left hemisphere; down) Right hemisphere.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0029644.g002
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GESTURE was higher than CONTEXT suggesting perhaps a
gesture processing preference role within these areas. Therefore,
we confirmed our prediction that when an emblematic gesture is
observed within it’s appropriate context, the intention behind the
gesture is fully captured and so, areas belonging to the mentalizing
system in addition to the putative human MNS also become
active.
Right IFG was associated in previous works with intentional
recognition processes besides action processing, implying a
visual environment as a supplementary or complementary
source of information. Related with object-directed actions, we
already mentioned Iacoboni et al. [7] who compared a hand
grasping action within different visual contexts and reported an
enlargement of the same IFG area related with intention
recognition. Another study exploiting visual scenarios for
intentional purposes was done by Tylen et al. [23]. They
investigated brain activity ca u s e db yan o tg e s t u r a lk i n do f
communication: the way we exploit everyday objects when
they are perceived as signals. As an explanation they mentioned
two scenes: a cluster of flowers on the roadside and a similar
bunch of flowers cut, tied and placed on the doorstep of a
house. Clearly, the second scene has a social, communicative
connotation: someone left the flowers for another person to find
them and understand the message. Following this line of
thought, they compared the brain activity of different commu-
nicative object scenarios versus other more conventional and
non-communicative object scenarios. They found bilateral
activity in the inferior frontal cortex predominantly on the
right side only in cases with social communicative connotation.
I ns p i t eo fb e i n gt h er i g h tI F Ga na rea classically associated with
action processing and belonging to the putative human MNS






size (voxels) Coordinates t-value
xyz
G-CONTEXT minus GESTURE
Right mid. occipital gyrus ,0.001 9528 34 286 14 6.37
Right posterior cingulate 20 256 18 5.11
Right precuneus 22 264 24 4.73
Right TPJ 52 250 16 5.23
Right SPL 22 268 54 4.51
Left sup. occipital gyrus ,0.001 5039 240 286 22 11.09
Left inf. occipital gyrus 222 292 28 5.53
Left precuneus 218 262 20 4.17
Right IFG 0.023 440 38 10 30 4.26
Right PMd 42 8 54 3.84
CONTEXT minus GESTURE
Right mid. occipital gyrus 0.032 356 20 286 28 7.15
Right posterior cingulate 0.028 195 20 256 16 6.63
Right mid. temporal gyrus 0.001 732 44 276 20 6.12
Left mid. occipital gyrus ,0.001 1161 224 284 26 6.02
G-CONTEXT minus CONTEXT
Left mid. occipital gyrus ,0.001 11292 244 268 4 10.13
Left TPJ 250 244 18 9.23
Left IFG 248 6 30 9.09
Left IPL 242 232 40 8.56
Left PMd 254 4 42 8.45
Left postcentral gyrus 252 226 38 6.85
Right TPJ ,0.001 3342 66 238 18 6
Right inf. occipital gyrus 36 292 26 4.57
Right IPL ,0.001 4317 34 244 56 8.61
Right postcentral gyrus 38 234 50 8.54
Right precuneus 18 248 40 5.42
Right posterior cingulate 24 258 14 4.3
Right IFG ,0.001 842 60 12 34 6.1
Right PMd 58 6 48 6
IFG: inferior frontal gyrus; PMd: dorsal premotor cortex; SPL: superior posterior parietal cortex; TPJ: temporoparietal junction.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0029644.t001
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scenarios highly suggests that this region of the IFG plays a
relevant role in the interpretation of the meaning of actions and
their intentionality. What is not conclusive yet, is whether the
visual modality of the context is activating this area or if the
context itself, no matter the input channel, is the relevant task
processed by this region. To answer this question further
investigation is needed.
The temporoparietal junction region was associated with the
representation of goals and intentions in the mentalizing system.
Saxe and Powell [25] demonstrated that the right and left TPJ as
well as the PCC were all recruited selectively when subjects read
stories about a protagonist’s thoughts or beliefs; being the right
TPJ particularly specific. Furthermore, damage to this region
causes selective deficits in judging the contents of other’s beliefs
[26]. Van Overwalle and Baetens [14] further suggested that the
TPJ orients to externally generated behaviour with the aim of
identifying the possible end-state of intentional behaviours.
According to Ciaramidaro et al. [27] the TPJ and the right pre-
cuneus are both activated along different social intentionality
dimensions, from private to social prospective intentions and
conversational interactions.
We found differences within the SPL on the right side during
the subtraction analysis. Previous studies have linked the SPL to
the monitoring of spatial information [28] but were not reported
to be associated to goals or belonging to intentional networks.
Since the G-CONTEXT stimulus integrates the gesture with the
appropriate environment it provides more spatial information
for orienting behavior than the other conditions; therefore,
more intensive activity would be expected in the SPL for this
condition. We also found activation of both the PC and PCC
bilaterally associated with the G-CONTEXT condition and
predominantly unilaterally mainly on the right hemisphere
in relation with CONTEXT condition. The PC and PCC are
intimate and bilaterally interconnected providing an anatomical
basis for their functional coupling [29]. The PC is also
extensively connected with the lateral parietal and temporo-
parietal-occipital cortices as well as with the frontal lobe [29].
The upper part of the PC is considered an area devoted to
multimodal sensory integration in general [30] and visuo-spatial
information processing in particular [31]. In turn, the lower part
of the PC is activated in various aspects of self-representation,
when ascribing social trait to others and during the interpre-
tation of social interaction between others [32–34]. The PCC,
together with the PC and prefrontal cortex is also active in
studies exploring theory of mind. Both, the PCC and PC
participate during the processing of our own intentions and
consequential actions and toge t h e rw i t ht h eT P Ji nt h et a s ko f
mental-state reasoning, when subject infers another person’s
thoughts or beliefs [11,25,35,36]. As a matter of fact, Joly et al
[37] demonstrated that an environment (i.e., church) raised
environmental specific social forms. The PC and adjacent PCC
are involved in the encoding and retrieval of spatial context of
events [38] and when complex goal context need to be
represented [39]. Moreover, it suggested that these areas would
be part of a core network underlying a variety of cognitive
functions which share the process of scenes construction, in
other words, the capacity of mentally generating and maintain-
ing a complex and coherent scene of events [40]. Therefore, it
seems quite possible that the PCC and PC are both recruited by
the mentalizing system to identify the situational frame and
context [41] and to provide and update complex contextual
associations; bilaterally, when the gesture is embedded in it’s
appropriate context and predominantly unilaterally (right sided)
when it is inferred through a specific environment.
Consequently, it may assume that to understand the full
meaning of a symbolic gesture performed in a natural context it is
necessary to recruit an integral network made up by components
of the putative human mirror neuron system as well as the
mentalizing one; some regions of this network like the PC and
PCC, seem to be predominantly recruited to provide contextual
associations.
Figure 3. Conjunction analysis. Regions where G-CONTEXT was
greater than GESTURE and CONTEXT.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0029644.g003





size (voxels) Coordinates t-value
xyz
Right posterior cingulate 0.037 132 14 252 16 8.22
Left sup. occipital gyrus 0.016 183 242 278 26 7.26
Right TPJ 0.034 271 50 256 16 6.93
Right precuneus 0.05 227 32 276 34 5.4
Left posterior cingulate * 0.001 38 216 262 18 5.13
Left precuneus * 0.003 226 274 24 4.1
Right IFG * 0.011 5 44 12 32 3.5
*voxel p (FDR-corr).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0029644.t002
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